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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16324

-vsRALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information and complaint
with the crime of aggravated robbery in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOh'ER COURT
The appellant, Ralph LeRoy Menzies, was convicted
by a jury before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., of
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County on
February 6, 1979, and was thereafter sentenced to be
cohlmitted to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent urges affirmance of the conviction
and sentence of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 17th day of July, 1978, a Tongan, Valfoa
Lealaitafea (hereafter victim), while eQployed as a taxi
driver, went to the area of Fourth East and Seventh South
to pick up a customer.

A man, subsequently identified by

the victim as the appellant, approached the taxi and
entered from the right rear door of the vehicle.

After the

victim had driven a short distance, the appellant pulled a
gun and

pc~G~cd

it directly at the victim.

After stopping

the vehicle, the victim was ordered to place his money in
a paper bag, which he did.

Then the victim was shot in the

arm as he attempted to grab the gun away from the appellant.
The appellant, still a passenger in the vehicle, broke out
a window of the taxi and fled on foot.

During the robbery,

the victim repeatedly looked at his assailant and he did
so with the intent of remembering the man at a later
date (R.l32).
The victim was shown an array of seven photographs
within a week of the incident, one of which was a picture
of the appellant, Ralph L. Menzies.

The victim identifed

that picture as being familiar and he stated the hair of
the individual in the photo was similar to that of his
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assailant (R.l28-l29).

About two weeks later the victim

again was shown a series of eight photographs, including
a more recent picture of appellant.

From that array,

he positively identified the appellant as the man who
robbed and shot him on the 17th of July, 1978 (R.l30).
Both photographic displays were conducted by
Detective William L. Abbott of the Salt Lake City Police
Department.

On the occasion of the first showing, he

testified that from ten or twelve pictures he had chosen
seven, one of which was the appellants.

The six

additional pictures were chosen because they were similar
to the appellant's picture in facial features as well as
hair length and style.

The second photographic array was

a series of eight photographs taken from a group of two
hundred photographs, and again each of the seven were
chosen because of their likeness to the appellant in
ethnic and racial features, hair color and facial
characteristics.

A second picture of the appellant, which

was taken at a time sequence more contemporary with the
incident, was included in the second lineup and Officer
Abbott testified that the victim made a positive and
absolute identification of the appellant during his
review of the second series of pictures.

On both

occasions DetectiveAbbotthanded the photographs to the
v1ctim and asked him to review them and see if any one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the pictures was of the man that robbed him.

After

having identified the defendant at the second photographic
lineup, the victim made several in-court identifications
of the appellant.
While confined in the county jail on an unrelated
matter, the appellant stated to several other inmates that
he had been involved in a robbery and during the incident
he had blown a Samoan or Tongan cab driver away.

One of

the other inmates, Louis Jaramillo, overheard the appellant
and reported the information to a member of the Salt Lake
City Police Department.

He subsequently testified at the

appellant's trlal that the appellant had admitted robbing
and shootlng a taxi driver of Tongan or Samoan ancestry.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED
WAS PROPERLY AD;1ITTED FOR THE JURY'S
CONSIDERATION BASED ON THE INDEPENDENT
RECOLLECTION OF THE VICTIM.
Respondent urges the Court to affirm the lower
court's conviction of the appellant based on the wellestablished rule of law that an in-court identification
may be properly admitted if the basis of that identificatioD
is the observations of the suspect independent of the lineup
identification.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.

218,
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87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18
L. Ed. 2 d ll 7 8 ( 196 7) .

In setting forth the test to be

applied, the court in Wade quoted from its decision
in Wong Sun v. United States, 371
S . Ct . 4 0 7 , 4 1 7 , 9 L . Ed. 2 d 4 41

u.s.

471, 488, 83

( 196 3 ) :

Whether, granting establishment
of the primary illegality, the evidence
to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.
Id. at 417.
The Court then set forth specific factors to
be considered in applying the test, including the
witnesses' opportunity to observe the criminal act, any
discrepancies between the pre-lineup description and the
defendant's actual description, the identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure
to identify the defendant on prior occasions, and the
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.

United States v. Wade, at 1938.

In adopting the holdings of the line of cases
set forth above, the Supreme Court of Utah held that an
in-court identification of the victim was admissible
1f the identification had an independent, original source.
State\'. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P.2d 786

(1969).
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J

When the State can successfully show that the in-court
identification is a product of the witnesses' observations
of the defendant at the time of the incident, the
identification may be admitted even if the pre-trial
identification procedures were procedurally tainted in
the same way.

United States v. Wade, supra;

Gilbert v. California, supra; State v. Vasquez,
supra.
In this case there is ample evidence to support
the conclusion that the victim identified the appellant
at the

t~~e

of

at

hi~

of trial based solely on his observation

~~e

tlme of the robbery.

Mr. Lealaitafea

testified that he saw the appellant enter his taxi
through the right rear door.

He again observed him when

the appellant spoke to him, and at that time he saw the
gun.

After stopping the car, and placing his money in

a bag the victim again got a close look at his assailant
as he handed him the bag.

Prior to the assailant's

fleeing the vehicle, the victim looked at him at least on
two additional occasions, and he testified that he studied
the assailant's face carefully so that he could recognize
him at a later date (R.l32).

The incident lasted about

fifteen minutes and the victim testified that there was
adequate light to allow

hi~

to make a positive

identificatic~
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of his assailant both at the time of the incident and
at the trial.

As in the Vasquez case, there was substantial

and competent evidence to support the determination of the
trial court that the identification testimony had an
independent source and was therefore properly submitted
to the jury for its consideration.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE
PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT
COULD BE ADMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION
OF THE JURY.
The appellant urged the trial court to suppress
the evidence concerning the victim's identification of the
appellant at pre-trial photographic lineups because of
an allegation of prejudice surrounding the procedures
used at those lineups.

His motion was denied.

Although

the appellant properly cites Simmons v. United States,
390

u.s.

377,

88

s.ct.

1967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247

(1968), as

the leading case in the area of photographic lineups,
he fails to apply its holding.

In the Simmons case, the

FBI agents obtained a series of pictures from the sister
of one of the accused individuals.

The pictures consisted

mostly of group photographs and from that array the
defendants were identified.

The number and quality of

photographs shown to the witnesses were not produced at
tr1al;

however the court noted the fact that both

de~e~~ants
appeared
several
theby thepictures
from
which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.in
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the witnesses made their pre-trial identifications.

In

rejecting the appellant's contention that the use of the
photographs was done in such a way as to be unduly
prejudicial the court held:
. . that each case must be considered
on its own facts, and that convictions based
on eyewitness identification at trial
following a pretrial identification by
photograph will be set aside on the ground
only if the photographic identification
procedure was so impermisslbly suggestive
as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
Id. at page 384

(emphasis added).

In applying the standard to the facts of the
Simmons case tts ccurt looked at several factors, to
include the

JU~t~fication

of the FBI in using the photo-

graphic array, the likelihood that the procedure used
may have produced a misidentification based on the inability
of the witnesses to identify the defendants, and whether
the witnesses had been contradictory in their identification
of the defendants at any stage of the proceeding.

The court

concluded that each witness had seen the defendants in a
well-lighted setting for up to five minutes, no masks
had been used by the defendants, and the witnesses were
consistent throughout in their identification of the
defendant Simmons.

As a result the court refused to

overturn the holding of the lower court admitting the
pretrial identification.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Applying the holding and analysis used by the
Court in Simmons to the case at hand results in a
similar conclusion.

At the time the photographs were

shown to the victim, the perpetrator of the most
serious crime was still unidentified.

The police attempt

to identify the robber by showing the victim a series of
pictures was clearly as justifiable in this case as it was in
Simmons.

Additionally, the victim stated that he was

with his assailant for at least 15 minutes in a setting
which was sufficiently well lit to allow him to see the
face of the robber clearly at least on five separate
occasions during that time.

Additionally, he stated that

he concentrated on his assailant's face to insure his
ability to identify that individual at a later date.

The

photographs of the appellant were shown to the appellant
within six or seven days on the first occasion and about
three weeks after the incident on the second, insuring
the opportunity to identify the individual while his
memory was fresh.

On both occasions the victim viewed

at least seven photographs which had been chosen from
larger groups because of their similarity to the features
of the appellant.

Detective Abbott testified that at the

time he showed the photo arrays to the victim, he asked
him to look at them and see if the man who robbed him was
one of the individuals included in the array (R.l75).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is no evidence to suggest that the victim was
directed to the picture of the accused by any of the
procedures employed by the police officer.

While in

Simmons the defendants were both included in several
of the pictures shown to the witnesses, in the case at
hand the victim saw one picture of the appellant in one

array, and another picture of the appellant during the
second lineup.

The pictures of the appellant were

substantially different, one being two years older than
the other.

In fact the victim did not think he had picked

a picture of the same man in the lineups.
Unde~

the picture cf

t~ose
~Ge

circumstances the victim identified

appellant at the first lineup as being

similar as to the hair style.

At the second lineup the

victim positively identified the appellant before even
looking at all of the pictures.

It is significant that

the second photograph of the appellant, which was so clearly
identified by Mr. Lealaitafea, had been taken more

contempor~~

with the time frame of the robbery than the first photograph.
Hence, although the victim was unsure as to the first
photograph, the second photo matched absolutely his memory
of his assailant.

At the preliminary hearing and at

trial there was absolutely no uncertainty on the
victim's part that the appellant was the sane individual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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that robbed him and shot him on the night of July 17,
1978.

The facts in this case are more compelling than

those of the Simmons case, and clearly call for the
conclusion that the procedures used during the pre-trial
identification stage were not impermissibly suggestive
and evidence thereof was properly admitted for the
jury's consideration by the trial court.
In adopting the holding of the Simmons case,
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah turned away from
a rigid formula and held that each case must be reviewed
individually and scrutinized carefully to insure that the
identification procedures employed were not so suggestive
as to preclude the witness from making an identification
based on his own knowledge and observation, rather than
as a result of the procedures themselves.
27 Utah 2d 48, 429 P. 2d 1349 (1972).

State v. Perry,

In subsequent

cases, with facts not at all unlike those of the case
at hand, the Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed lower
court decisions admitting evidence derived from the use
of pretrial photographic lineups.

State v. Wettstein,

28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 (1972); State v. Jenkins,
523 P.2d 1232

(1974).

In Wettstein, the Court held that

even though the only picture shown with a mustache was
that of the defendant, under all of the circumstances the
trial court properly found that the identification was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
by ~he
of the
photographic
The
Libraryconduct
Services and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah State display.
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lower court's decision in this case to admit the
testimony concerning the pre-trial identification
of the accused is factually in harmony with the entire
line of cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court
concerning this question.
In his brief the appellant cites United States
v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182 (1975), and United States v.
Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in support of
his contention that the procedures used during the pretrial
identification process were unduly prejudicial and the
evidence derived therefrom should be excluded.

However,

both of the cases cited are distinguishable as to their
facts, and

a~e

~lsapplied

in the case at hand.

In the Sanders case, the photographs presented
to the witnesses included only two which showed an
individual with any facial hair.

One of these individuals

had a mustache, very short sideburns and a slight goatee.
That individual was also not dark in complexion.

The picture

of the defendant was the other showing a man with facial
hair, and he had a heavy mustache, and sideburns down to
his goatee or beard, which was full.

He also had a much

darker complexion and the picture showed him to be much
heavier than the other individuals whose photographs were
shown to the witnesses.

ht the lineup, the defendant was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the tallest man, and the only heavy-set stout person who
had a full mustache and full goatee.
Sanders, supra at 1196.

United States v.

Additionally, the defendant was

the only individual to appear in both the photo array and
the lineup and one of the witnesses stated that she was
better able to identify the defendant because of the
identification procedure.

Under the circumstances presented

and consistent with its holding in Simmons v. United States,
supra, the Court held:
The initial photographic identification
procedures were impermissibly suggestive
. We have examined the photographs shown
to the witnesses, and the photographs of
the lineup. The stark fact is that appellant
fairly leaps out of the pictures as the
one person who is different. . . When there
is added to the equation the fact that
t~ese are distinctive characteristics
attributed to the robber
. . and that
he was the one man whose photograph had
previously been shown to both witnesses,
it was well-nigh inevitable that he would
be chosen in the circumstances.
United States v. Sanders, supra at 1197 (emphasis added).
what the court objected to was the impermissibly
suggestive pre-trial identification procedure taken as
a whole, which was used in the case.

Sanders does not

stand for the proposition, as the appellant contends,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that if two lineups are conducted and the appellant's
picture is the only one used in both, the subsequent
identification is impermissibly tainted.

That is

but one of the factors that must be considered, and
absent a combination of other factors which also
taint the procedure, that circumstance alone would
not require the exclusion of evidence of such a
procedure.

Except for the use of a picture of the

appellant in both photographic arrays, the other
factors present in Sanders are missing from this case,
and it is therefore not applicable.
the case before

t~e

The victim in

Court had adequate opportunity

to see his assailant; there were not impermissibly
suggestive statements made by the police while
conducting the photographic lineups; the evidence
suggests that the pictures used in both lineups
were chosen because of their similarity to the
appellant, and the second group of photographs
introduced at trial verify that fact; and finally
the victim's description and testimony have remained
consistent based on his observation of the appellant
at the time of the robbery.

Respondent therefore

submits that the findings of the lower court are
clearly consistent with the holding of United States v.
Sanders and should be affirmed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the Keller case, the Court refused to allow a
conviction to stand when the witness was unable to identify
the defendant in court, and merely stated at the pre-trial
indentification stage that of the pictures he viewed, the
defendant's picture looked most like the individual who
committed the alleged crime.

Clearly those facts, and the

holding of the Court in that case do not apply in the present
situation.
The Courts have been given substantial discretion
in attempting to determine under what circumstances pretrial
identification procedures are impermissibly suggestive.
State v. Perry, supra.
884

(1970)

In United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d

the lOth Circuit held that it was not impermissibly

suggestive for the police to show the witness two groups of
photographs with a picture of the defendant in both.

In that

case the witness failed to identify the defendant from a group
of three black and white photographs.

At a subsequent array

the witness was shown 3 color photographs and one black and
white photograph.

Two of those pictures were of the defendant

and the witness successfully identified both.

The Court did

not find that improper, and noted in conclusion that the
inability of one witness to identify the defendant reinforced
the finding that the government's techniques were not overly
sugges=ivc.

Id. at page 887.

See also United States v.
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Patterson, 447 F.2d 424 (1971).

In United States v. Munn,

507 F.2d 563 (1974) a witness was shown seven photographs,
each of which was a male caucasian, each was of the same
general age grouping; each had considerable hair and of a
similar color; four were clean shaven and three were not.
The Court held that the array was not impermissibly suggestive
and rejected the defendant's contention that it was.

Several

other lOth Circuit decisions have upheld a variety of procedurE
used in conducting pretrial identification procedures.
United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d 882 (1973); United States
v. Woodring, 446 F.2d 733 (1971); United States v. Milano,
443 F.2d 1022

r::_gn).

The courts have consistently upheld

government procedures which have included a variety of
procedures not dissimilar from the
hand.

o~e

used in the case at

The mere fact that the photograph of the defendant was

included in both lineups does not make the procedure impermis-'
sibly suggestive and the appellant cannot cite any authority
that it does.

On the contrary, the cases squarely support

the conclusion that under the circumstances, the steps taken
during the pretrial identification stage were not unduly
suggestive and evidence derived therefrom was properly admit:c
by the lower court.
The appellant's second arc;ument concerning the iss·;'
of due process deprivations is based on the gov0rnrnent's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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inability to produce the photographs used at the first
lineup.

Detective Abbott testified that he picked seven

photographs from a bulletin board containing roughly ten
or twelve photographs.

After presenting them to the victim

for his inspection he returned the photographs to the bulletin
board.

As a result they were not available to the defense

or the Court at the time of trial.
Although the appellant states in his brief that the
issue here presented has not been decided, respondent cites
for the Court's consideration the case of State v. Volberding,
infra, and submits that it is dispositive of this issue.
The facts are nearly identical and the court's ruling is
exactly on point.
In that case the demand that the photographic array
be reproduced could not be met because the pictures used had
been returned to the Sheriff's files.
t~e
~art

In that case, as in

case at hand, there was no evidence of negligence on the
of the officer conducting the lineup nor was there a

showing of any intentional suppression of evidence in order
to undermine the rights of the defendant.

The court in the

face of an argument nearly identical to the one made by the
a?pellant, reasoned that:
Such a claim must be evaluated in
of the total1ty of circumstances.

lJ~tt
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Defendant argues that such an evaluation cannot be made without reproduction of the display.
Such a
contention is without merit, particularly
in light of SiJ11I:lons, Ylrhere the photographs
displayed to witnesses were not produced
to the court .
. the two witnesses observed the
defendant for approximately one hour
and conversed with him.
The photographic
display was made the following day, while
the memories of the witnesses were still
fresh.
There was justification to use
this procedure, since defendant had not
been apprehended.
The foregoing factual
circumstances concerning defendant's
identification do not establish a denial
of due process of law (emphasis added) .
State v. Volberding, 30 Utah 2d 257, at 259, 516 P.2d
357 (1973).
Addi tior.a::_::_,

::-. \'olberding, supra, the Court rejected the

appellant's argument that he was denied his right to conduct
a meaningful cross-examination because of the unavailability
of the photographic display at trial. Id. at page 259.
Appellant contends that to uphold the lower Court's decision
in this case would be tantamount to extending an invitation
to law enforcement personnel to deliberately or recklessl'y
destroy evidence after it had served its purpose.

However,

the court has addressed this issue and correctly held that
a deliberate suppression or destruction of evidence by those
charged with the prosecution constitutes a denial of due
process.

State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Ctah 1975).
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The

line of cases cited by the appellant are a restatement of
that position which has been clearly resolved by the State
Supreme Court.

The respondent does not take issue with

the holding in Stewart, but submits that in the case at
hand, the decision in Volberding is dispositive of the issue
and can be applied to this case without conflicting with
cases dealing with deliberate or reckless destruction of the
evidence, and without fear of promoting the willful destruction
of evidence by those charged with the prosecutorial function.
Appellant cites the case of State v. Wright, 557
P.2d l

(Wash. 1976) and urges the court to adopt its holding

in this case as a basis for reversing the lower court.
Respondent contends that the issue as to suppression of
evidence and its due process impact resolved by the court
in lvright, supra, was compatibly resolved in Utah by virtue
of the Stewart decision.

Additionally it must be pointed out

that the facts in Wright are such that even if the court
concludes that Wright does not stand for the same proposition
as Stewart, its facts are such that it should not be applied
in

t~e

case before the court.
As pointed out by the Court in Wright, the evidence

sou~h~

related
th·~

by the appellant in the present case was intimately
~o

the very existence of a homicide.

Additionally,

cc•urt found:
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l

. there was a reasonable possibility
that the evidence destroyed by the police
or at their direction was material to
guilt or innocence and favorable to
appellant.
State v. Wright, supra, at page 6.
Respondent does not see the same compelling circumstance in
this case, that would warrant a similar conclusion reached
in the Wright case.

The photographic array at which the

pictures were used, did not even result in a positive
identification of the appellant.

Their importance is further

reduced by substantial evidence proving an independent basis
for the victim's in-court identification of the accused.
Assuming ther'C'f:::r·2, tchat even if the photographs had been
produced and were found to be procedurally tainted, the
evidence which appellant urges the court to exclude, would
still be admissible based on its independent basis.
States v. Wade;

State v. Vasquez, supra.

United

Hence, \rlright,

~'

and the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the appellant
are distinguishable in law and fact, and do not merit
individual discussion in light of State v. Volberding, supra,
which respondent respectfully submits is dispositive of
appellant's due process argument.
COHCLUSION
Notwithstanding the failure of the government to
produce the requested photographs at trial, the lower court
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was well within its discretion in finding the appellant
guilty in this case.

The in-court identification was based

on the victim's independent observations and recollections
at the time of the robbery and not as a result of the pretrial
identification procedure.
The procedure used by the police at both lineups
was consistent with the due process requirements of the
14th Amendment, and the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case
of State v. Volberding, supra, has already held that it is
not necessary that the government reproduce the photographic
array for the defense at trial.
For the above-stated reasons the reapondent urges
this Court to affirm the conviction and sentence of the
accused.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. H&"lSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL D. SMITH
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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